1. Moral understanding

I introduce the idea of moral understanding with a puzzle about moral testimony: it seems to be wrong, or at any rate not ideal, to make moral judgements by taking someone else's word as to what to do. What is the problem with moral testimony? In short, I argue that the problem is that moral testimony can convey moral knowledge, but not moral understanding, so the puzzle shows first that moral understanding and moral knowledge are distinct, and second that it is moral understanding that we seek. This work has attracted a lot of attention, some defending my solution to the puzzle, others proposing their own solutions. But moral understanding in its own right has not yet had the kind of attention that it deserves. I argue that moral understanding requires a distinctive grasp of morality. This grasp involves the abilities to explain why actions are right or wrong and to judge new moral situations correctly. Moral understanding is distinct from, and does not require, moral knowledge, and so it may be available when moral knowledge is not (e.g. when there is a lot of moral disagreement or only weak reasons for belief). Moral understanding, I argue, plays an essential role in moral virtue and in acting for the right reasons, and so has a special value and importance in ethics. I am currently bringing all this work together into a monograph on the nature of and value of moral understanding (book proposal under consideration with OUP).

2. Aesthetics and ethics

There are three topics at the intersection of ethics and aesthetics on which I am carrying out research.
a. Aesthetic obligation. Morality is a domain of value but also of obligation. Aesthetics, by contrast, is often taken to be a domain of value that is merely discretionary. I argue that this is a mistake. There are aesthetic obligations of a similar type to moral obligations, that is, obligations whose force depends on the aesthetic reasons that are their basis. I give two examples of aesthetic obligations, a duty that binds artists not to deliberately create less valuable works of art, and a duty that binds us all not to destroy valuable artworks.
b. Aesthetic virtue. Taking virtue to be an 'orientation' towards a kind of value or reason, including dispositions to judgement, feeling and action, I argue that there are aesthetic virtues that are similar to moral virtues. In particular, I outline conceptions of aesthetic courage and aesthetic honesty.
c. The value of artworks. A Kantian approach to ethics distinguishes people, who have 'dignity', a value 'beyond price' from objects which have 'mere price', which can be exchanged and even destroyed for the sake of other goals. But artworks seem to fall somewhere between the two. I consider arguments as to whether artworks can attain as near as possible the kind of value that persons have.

3. Creativity (with Alexander Bird)

Standard accounts of creativity take creativity to be a disposition to create novel works that are valuable in some way. Creativity itself is therefore always to be valued highly. In a series of collaborative papers (e.g. 'Against Creativity', PPR 2022), Alexander Bird and I argue that these views are mistaken. Creativity can sometimes be exercised in the production of works of no value. In our view, what is distinctive about creativity is that it involves exercise of the imagination. Since creativity is not necessarily valuable according to our view, it is important to ask the question: under what circumstances does creativity produce value? We emphasise the importance of understanding a tradition of valuable work to guide the imagination. We are in the process of preparing a major grant application for the AHRC, with a book as one principal outcome (proposal under consideration with OUP), together with impact-related activities with the Creative Education Trust.

4. Trust and trustworthiness

I develop a novel view of trustworthiness as a kind of responsibility, and I argue that trustworthiness, understood in this way, is a moral virtue. Responsibility involves having the right kind of values and good judgement, so that one can make good decisions whatever transpires.

The standard view of trust is that it is a kind of reliance, and that primarily has instrumental value, corresponding to the standard view of trustworthiness as a kind of reliance (which I reject). Instead, I argue that we should regard as a kind of confidence. I look at the role of feelings of betrayal for understanding the nature and value of trust, arguing that in the context of intimate relationships, trust has a final (non-instrumental) value.

Trust and trustworthiness are topics of great practical significance and I have already had interest in my published work for practitioners. I hope to develop this impact- relevant side of this work in the future, through an AHRC grant applied for with the Ethox Centre for Population Health, which involves workshops with the NHS and the police, and with other partners.

5. A Very Short Introduction to Kant (with Anil Gomes)

The book will begin with an introductory chapter giving an overview of Kant's life and his work outside of philosophy. After that the book will divide into three parts, corresponding to the three questions that Kant himself described as organizing his philosophy, namely: what can I know? What must I do? And what can I hope? I will write the sections on Kant's ethics, politics and aesthetics, with Anil Gomes covering the theoretical philosophy. The book is aimed at beginning students and non-academic readers and we hope it will reach a very wide audience.